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"NEXT TIME, TRY LOOKING IT UP IN YOUR 
GUT!!": Tolerance, Civility, and Healthy 
Conflict in a Tea Party Era 
Jason A. Springs 
Qn October 17, 2005, the hyper-conservative political pundit 
and cultural icon Stephen Colbert introduced the concept 
"truthiness" during the inaugural episode of his show, The Colbert 
Report. Colbert explained The Word as follows: 
Now I'm sure some of the Word Police, the wordanistas over at 
Webster's are gonna say, "Hey, that's not a word." Well, anybody 
who knows me knows that I'm no fan of dictionaries or reference 
books. They're elitist. Constantly telling us what is or isn't true, or 
what did or didn't happen. Who's Britannica to tell me the Pan- 
ama Canal was finished in 1914? If I want to say it happened in 
1941, that's my right. I don't trust books. They're all fact, no heart. 
And that's exactly what's pulling our country apart today. Because 
face it, folks, we are a divided nation. Not between Democrats and 
Republicans, or Conservatives and Liberals, or tops and bottoms. 
No, we are divided between those who think with their head, and 
those who know with their heart. Consider Harriet Miers. If you 
think about Harriet Miers, of course her nomination's absurd. But 
the President didn't say he thought about his selection. He said "I 
know her heart." Notice how he said nothing about her brain? He 
didn't have to. He feels the truth about Harriet Miers. And what 
about Iraq? If you think about it, maybe there are a few missing 
pieces to the rationale for war. But doesn't taking Saddam out feel 
like the right thing? Right here? Right here in the gut? Because 
that's where the truth comes from ladies and gentlemen, the gut. Do you know you have more nerve endings in your stomach than in your head? Look it up. Now somebody's gonna say, "I did look 
that up, and it's wrong." Well mister, that's because you looked it 
up in a book. Next time, try looking it up in your gut. I did, and 
my gut tells me that's how our nervous system works. Now I know 
some of you may not trust your gut yet. But with my help, you will. The truthiness is: anyone can read the news to you. I promise to feel the news at you. 
Soundings 94.3-4 (Fall/Winter 2011). ISSN 0038-1861. 
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At one level, Colbert's diatribe about "truthiness" is an instance 
of political satire pure and simple. And yet, taken to mean simply 
the opposite of what it says, The Word's message is as clear as it is 
monochromatic: the opposite of fact is feeling or wishful think- 
ing, and much of political and media culture today ideologically 
exudes, calls forth, and manipulates feelings, casting reason and 
empirical evidence in opposition to what it parades as intuition 
and common sense. In contemporary North American public dis- 
course, such oppositions typically take the form of antagonism 
between so-called "intellectualist elitism" that extols the force of 
the better argument, factual evidence, and measured exchange 
of reasons, on one hand, and what is sometimes derided as 
"know-nothing" populism that affirms the sufficiency of common 
sense or self-evidence of moral intuitions or religious truths, on 
another. The former espouses open-mindedness, fallibilism, and 
tolerance toward reasonable differences. The latter claims that 
self-evident orintuitively plain truths compel those who will rec- 
ognize them to stand against the latent relativism which in fact 
underlies the alleged moral high ground of "tolerance."1 
Understood as a value that aims to mediate potentially explo- 
sive conditions of deep religious and moral diversity, tolerance 
has deep roots in Enlightenment rationalism. This tradition of 
thinking understands tolerance to be a correlate of the human 
capacity to entertain and evaluate a range of alternatives, and to 
then reasonably select among them. So conceived, tolerance 
stands in contrast o the urgings of passion, affect, and visceral 
inclinations.2 From this perspective, the dictates of "the gut" that 
manifest hemselves in the passionate character of attachments, 
convictions, prejudices, and sentiments risk rendering some peo- 
ple impervious to "the force of the better argument" and factual 
evidence. "The gut," one might say, anchors a perspective in- 
clined to suspect meticulous and measured reason-exchange as 
either the mark of smooth-talking sophistry - cleverly "making 
the weaker argument appear the stronger, and the stronger the 
weaker" - or as "intellectual bullying." The present paper is an 
attempt to think transformatively about, and perhaps beyond, 
such oppositional framing. 
In this paper I argue that the hope for engaging in democratic 
discourse across the deep divisions in current U.S. public life de- 
pends less upon further calls for more tolerance, and more upon 
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thinking of ways to constructively reframe conflict and intoler- 
ance. Is it possible to distinguish between constructive and de- 
structive forms of intolerance? If so, what are the prospects for 
re-orienting analysis of current practices and processes so that 
things that look like simple intolerance (and thus, candidates for 
marginalization or exclusion from political processes) could be 
reconceived and re-directed for constructive purposes? Is there 
such a thing as healthy conflict? If so, how might we describe it? 
Answers to these questions may be found in various trands of 
the "religion-in-public-life" debates that have unfolded over re- 
cent decades among religious ethicists and political philoso- 
phers, and in conflict ransformation literature in peace studies.3 
The former demonstrate that a properly construed tradition of 
democratic practices provides a means of mediating conflict 
amid the challenges presented by deep religious and moral plu- 
ralism. With respect to the latter, I will develop the notion that 
conflict ought not to be papered over with a veneer of tolerance, 
and then valorized as an achievement of peace.4 Rather, we 
should think in terms of "healthy conflict," where volatile - even 
apparently intransigent - disagreements are confronted in an at- 
tempt to creatively transform the oppositional frames that hold 
those disagreements in place. 
In Part I, I consider the questions posed above in light of a 
particularly intense episode of religiously-motivated conflict. In 
Part II, I examine how the need for distinguishing between 
healthy and unhealthy forms of conflict emerged as a pressing 
point of debate in the field of religious ethics. In Parts III 
through V, I carry forward the underdeveloped strands of this 
debate by describing a framework for thinking in terms of 
healthy conflict. 
I. When the Culture Wars Came to Campus 
For a scholar of religion and conflict in public life it was nearly 
a dream come true. President Obama had accepted an invitation 
to give the year's commencement address and to receive an hon- 
orary degree from the university where I teach. A number of stu- 
dents, administrators and faculty, and alumni expressed outrage. 
In this, they were joined by (seemingly) legions of outside 
groups. The objections centered on the President's positions on 
abortion and stem cell research, which stood at odds with the 
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official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. This was a first; 
while Notre Dame had hosted presidents for commencement in 
the past, it had never done so in the context of the so-called "cul- 
ture wars" that have dominated the U.S. political scene since the 
early 1980s. 
Within weeks of the announcement activists and protestors de- 
scended upon the campus. Randall Terry, previously of Opera- 
tion Rescue, set up headquarters in a rented house a mile or so 
away. Each morning several dozen protesters lined the main en- 
tryway to campus with signs and the occasional bullhorn. Many 
held four-foot by four-foot color placards portraying the bloody 
remains of late-term aborted fetuses. Others held signs that read: 
"Stop killing our children," thousands more murdered today," 
"Shame on Notre Dame," and "Our lady is weeping." For the 
weeks leading up to commencement a bi-plane circled over the 
campus non-stop, pulling behind it a giant, bright-colored ban- 
ner picturing yet another bloody, aborted fetus. A "truth truck" 
circulated through town pulling behind it large portraits of the 
University's president and President Obama at either hand of Ju- 
das Iscariot. 
Mary Ann Glendon, previously U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican 
and currently a professor at Harvard Law School, was slated to 
address the graduating class at commencement, and to receive 
the Laetere Medal - the University's highest honor, awarded an- 
nually to an influential American Catholic. Having learned that 
Obama was to receive an honorary degree, Glendon withdrew. 
Stating that she favored serious debate, Glendon nonetheless 
noted that honoring Obama expressly contradicted the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops' charge that Catholic institutions 
"should not honor those who act in defiance of our fundamental 
moral principles." In such cases, the Bishops held that opponents 
"should not be given awards, honors or platforms which would 
suggest support for their actions" (Glendon, "Declining"). 
With the culture-warriors all around us, my Senior Seminar in 
Religion, Multiculturalism, and Conflict was working through the 
Introduction to the updated edition of John Rawls' Political Liber- 
alism. My students were eager to discuss the events unfolding 
around us in light of their reading, perhaps especially because 
Randall Terry and company had promised to turn the Com- 
mencement into a "circus." Our seminar oom conversations un- 
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folded quite differently from the exchanges going on at the 
entryway to campus. The class disagreed passionately about the 
merits of Rawls' claim that stability and reasonableness of public 
deliberation require religiously committed citizens to restrain 
their religion-specific reasoning when engaging in public dis- 
course about matters of basic justice. Yet, wherever they stood on 
that question, the students universally agreed the protestors bear- 
ing signs declaring that "Abortion is not something we will dia- 
logue about" were doing something wrong. 
Advocating "serious dialogue" between rival viewpoints be- 
came the way by which University administrators justified 
Obama's invitation in the face of mounting public criticism. The 
protestors' igns responded directly to this justification. My stu- 
dents all agreed that such refusal of dialogue portrayed a particu- 
larly grave vice. It was symptomatic of an egregious form of 
intolerance - a kind of unreasonable, conversation-stopping fun- 
damentalism - uncompromising in its views to the point of refus- 
ing dialogue or debate altogether. The students thought it clear 
that reasoned debate required a measure of tolerance, and thus 
that tolerance and dialogue are goods that any citizen of a de- 
mocracy ought to acknowledge, however strongly he or she feels 
about a particular issue. This insight emerged as "moral high 
ground" in our discussions. My students considered that they 
were willing to enter serious dialogue with those whose views they 
opposed, and they considered the protesters unwilling. 
I pressed them: intuitive as this position appeared to them, did 
it account for the possibility that the deeply conflicting views 
presented by this case might simply be irreconcilable? Insofar as 
it provided a warrant for dismissing those deemed intolerant, he 
students' notion of tolerance risked underwriting its own refusal 
of engagement. The protesters at the campus gates did not re- 
fuse engagement altogether, else they would not have been 
standing where they were. The graphic signs of aborted fetuses 
they held up aimed to evoke revulsion and disgust in those who 
passed by. There was engagement here, even if those involved 
refused explicit conversation in the form of the reciprocal ex- 
change of reasons. The prospects for constructive intervention 
thus seemed to depend upon recognizing the protesters' particu- 
lar mode of engagement, grappling with its nuances, and imagin- 
ing some form of response (other than dismissal). What were the 
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prospects for doing this without merely rendering more invidi- 
ous the oppositions that already marked out that context? 
II. Religious Dissension and Healthy Conflict 
"If religious differences are likely to remain in place for the 
foreseeable future, how are we to reason with one another re- 
spectfully, productively, on issues of public importance? And how 
might we build coalitions among citizens of various persuasions 
to fight effectively for a just social order?" (Stout, "Pragmatism" 
441). These questions are two of the most pivotal to emerge from 
the religion and public life debates that have unfolded among 
ethicists and philosophers over the last three decades. In rehears- 
ing them, Jeffrey Stout gestured toward forms of public engage- 
ment that he described as "achievable by our efforts, in which 
citizens who disagree on religious and ethical questions create a 
political discussion that is more genuinely democratic in form 
and content han the one we're having now." Engaging the seem- 
ingly stultifying forms of conflict hat arise in religiously diverse 
and culturally plural contexts more democratically involves ex- 
panding the compass of the kinds of reasons that might be em- 
ployed in public, in addition to widening the circle of 
participants. To these ends, Stout invited his interlocutors - in 
particular, fellow citizens motivated by deep religious commit- 
ments and strong moral convictions - to "love justice, think hard 
about civility, and then say what they wish to the rest of us, 
whether that happens to be religious in content or not" ("Prag- 
matism" 434). 
John Kelsay responded by pointing out that expanding the 
compass of argument and engagement would call upon skills and 
tools common to comparative ethical analysis: "listening carefully 
to others, interpreting them as reason-givers like oneself and 
one's near companions, arguing with them in the spirit of fellow 
seekers, and with the possibility of personal and social expan- 
sion" (Kelsay 698). Kelsay added that such practices and skills 
avail themselves for democratic purposes not because they hold 
the key to resolving conflict over the most pressing and persistent 
controversies; rather, they afford fairly ordinary means by which 
fellow citizens might understand and meaningfully engage each 
other in "healthy conflict" over divisive, seemingly intractable 
issues.5 
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Critics of Democracy and Tradition claimed that encouraging fel- 
low citizens to enter public political discourse and to think hard 
about civility - even to cultivate its virtues - and then inviting 
them to speak in the terms that they saw fit was a bit naïve. In- 
deed, some argued that the overriding concern with the nature 
and basis of epistemic justification in giving and asking for rea- 
sons made Stout's proposals ideal for scholarly circles, but ill- 
suited for lay audiences.6 Could the cultivation of deliberative vir- 
tues by which fellow-citizens hold one another accountable for 
the validity of their inferences through the measured exchange 
of reasons really overcome the combative, shrill, and strident 
character of contemporary political discourse? 
This question has presented itself starkly in the age of Barack 
Obama, whose stated aims have been to inspire and elevate the 
character and content of political discourse. From those who per- 
sisted for years in their demands that Obama hand over his 
Kenyan birth certificate or who insist hat he is a closet Muslim, 
to the Tea Party movement, to those shouting down Congres- 
sional representatives at Town Hall meetings in protest of "death 
panels" supposedly mandated by the 2009 health-care reform, to 
gun-toting attendees at Presidential town hall meetings, to inef- 
fective "fact-check" websites, to Rep. Joe Wilson's irrepressible cry 
'You lie!" during a presidential address to a joint session of Con- 
gress, to much of what gets broadcast by Fox News and the other 
twenty-four-hour c rporate media networks - all these lead some 
to the conclusion that civil, mutually respectful argument is an 
illusion, a figment of an idealistic democratic imagination.7 
One response to such unhandsome conditions is to say that 
the items cited reflect a marginal (if vocal) fringe lement, and 
that the vociferousness with which these voices project them- 
selves into public life simply demonstrates how removed they are 
from the mainstream. In this sense, things are actually not as bad 
as they seem.8 A second response is to damn the fray as irra- 
tional, emotivist, and as further evidence that what aims to pass 
for democratic discourse really boils down to "pseudo-demo- 
cratic babble," the arbitrary contest of will against will in "civil 
war carried on by other means" (Maclntyre, After Virtue 236). In 
such circumstances the parties refuse to listen to one another, 
rebuff norms of reciprocity, and deny that their opponents are 
fellow-seekers. The only proper approach is thus to ensure the 
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defeat or the conversion of one's opponents. In this case the cir- 
cumstances of our public life give rise to deep skepticism about 
the viability of democratic practices, especially with respect to the 
arbitration of religiously motivated conflict. 
In this respect, it is worth remembering that such skepticism 
about democratic practices did much to set contemporary de- 
bates about religion in public life in motion in the first place. 
Recall, for instance, the closing pages of After Virtue, where Alas- 
dair Maclntyre indexed what he characterized as the incapacity 
of liberal democracies to actually resolve moral conflict. The laws 
of liberal states, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, basi- 
cally serve "peace-making" or "truce-keeping" functions. "What 
our laws show is the extent and degree to which conflict has to be 
suppressed," he wrote (236). The argument suggested that, in a 
society as litigious as the contemporary United States - where the 
weightier a social or moral issue is, the more likely it is to be 
decided by the Supreme Court - the impossibility of meaningful 
moral conflict is compensated for by the functioning of the state, 
which "imposes a bureaucratized unity on a society which lacks 
genuine moral consensus" (236). Of course, on this view, even 
legal adjudication does not actually hold conflict in abeyance. 
Rather, the contest of preferences gets pushed back one level, 
playing out (for instance) in the form of opposing efforts to in- 
fluence (or altogether obstruct) the procedures by which pivotal 
judicial rulings get made (i.e., through Supreme Court and other 
judicial appointments).9 
Advocates of healthy conflict must think transformatively 
about the conditions that motivate such skeptical complaints. 
They should resist he dual temptation: either to make invidious 
or overly polarizing contrasts, thus exacerbating conflict, or to 
diminish the depth and severity of disagreements in question, 
perhaps in hopes of making them go away. We need to find ways 
of reframing intolerance, identifying the constructive potentiali- 
ties of conflict and developing strategies for engagement be- 
tween citizens. 
III. When Tolerance is Not Enough 
In our contemporary context, "tolerance" is a term widely en- 
dorsed as an antidote for the negative effects of religious and 
moral difference. Yet, work by Robert Wuthnow has suggested 
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that it is also a concept practically devoid of content.10 In fact, 
contemporary discourse seems susceptible to Herbert Marcuse' s
critique of "pure tolerance."11 
Marcuse claimed that tolerance in the 1960s was widely under- 
stood as cultivated indifference. He further claimed that the ac- 
companying behaviors - restrained aversion, or suppression of 
revulsion at perceived deviance - were insidiously repressive. 
First, while heralding itself as impartial, tolerance was quite parti- 
san. It amounted to default support of a social and political status 
quo, "the already established machinery of discrimination" (Mar- 
cuse 36) . If "pure tolerance" successfully fostered a more or less 
tranquil coexistence between volatile opponents, it did so at the 
cost of leaving the root causes of potential conflict - things like 
racial discrimination and economic injustice - untouched. Sec- 
ondly, Marcuse claimed that as a prevailing feature of broadly 
accepted common sense, tolerance had morphed "from an active 
to a passive state, from practice to non-practice" (34). A nearly 
unquestioned "civic virtue" thus actually served to discourage ap- 
proaches designed to expose unjust conditions and to inspire 
positive change.12 
Similarly today: a thin veneer of tolerant, "live-and-let-live" de- 
tachment frequently veils or represses more deep-seated atti- 
tudes, rendering these more explosive when they finally 
surface.13 To tolerate is to "bear with" or "endure" - to sublimate 
disapproval of - practices or beliefs that one recognizes as "objec- 
tionable or deviant" (Little 3).14 Taken as the primary approach 
to political and religiously-motivated conflict, such a conception 
risks leaving citizens under-prepared for circumstances inwhich 
passions boil over and people are unresponsive to calls for peace- 
ful co-existence. From this perspective, tolerance is like antibiot- 
ics - over-reliance can actually lead to immunity from the 
antidote, rather than the disease. 
How, then, to grapple with the possibility that incivility and 
intolerance may not be merely nagging accidents to which demo- 
cratic processes and practitioners are occasionally prone, but 
rather elements intrinsic to those processes and practices? After 
all, Walt Whitman described the American democratic experi- 
ment of his own day as an "appalling spectacle" saturated by 
"melodramatic screaming, patriotic and jingoistic gestures," and 
a "mass of petty banter" (West 189-90). 15 Our context is thus not 
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so unique. If such behaviors are endemic to democratic prac- 
tices, then it will not do to aim at eliminating them once and for 
all. Moreover, gauging the viability of democratic practices - and 
the healthiness of the conflict therein - by the degree to which 
such elements have been successfully contained or rooted out 
may be a formula for despair. The challenge, rather, is to de- 
velop an account of democratic practice that aims to think cre- 
atively about the persistence of incivility and intolerance. How is 
this possible? 
IV. Speaking Truthiness to Power 
Nearly a decade before Stephen Colbert made his critical in- 
tervention on behalf of "truthiness," political philosopher Wil- 
liam Connolly was investigating the discursive, political and 
cultural consequence of "the gut," or what he calls "the thought- 
imbued feelings built into the stomach" (Secularist 176). Histori- 
cally, the visceral registers presented a fault-line broadly under- 
stood to divide prejudice, passion, experience, and belief 
associated with religious commitment from reasonableness, fact, 
and tolerance. This approach has been central to the ascendance 
of secularism in Europe and North America generally, and simi- 
larly indispensable to the framing of the "culture wars" in con- 
temporary politics (3). 
Connolly sought to subvert this dichotomy, arguing that vis- 
ceral registers are in fact inextricable from our rational capaci- 
ties. They are thus as susceptible to engagement as reason. He 
writes: 
[W] e now know, the stomach has a simple cortical organization of 
its own. This infrasensible c nter stores thought-imbued feelings 
of sadness, anxiety, happiness, disgust, anger, and revenge to be 
activated under particular circumstances, a  when, for example, an 
intense feeling of disgust rises up when you observe someone pick- 
ing his nose and eating it. Or when you observe public signs of a 
practice of sexuality that disturbs the sense of naturalness sedi- 
mented into your own. . .. [I]t is no longer feasible to treat "the 
sensible" as simply dumb, or automatic, or equipped with only 
slight capacities for sublimation and augmentation. The sensi- 
ble. . . [is a] domain in which we think, within which intensities of 
cultural appraisal are stored, and through which we value and de- 
value. . .. The visceral register, moreover, can be drawn on to 
thicken an intersubjective ethos of generous engagement between 
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diverse constituencies or to harden strife between partisans." {Secu- 
larist 175, 177)16 
Such claims take seriously the truth in "truthiness." The pivotal 
premise here is that the visceral register is not easily transcended. 
In fact, it is really not transcendable at all. At times "thought- 
imbued intensities" well up into the frame of consciousness. 
Sometimes they operate at a level below conscious recognition, 
yet inform and frame perception and experience. To dismiss or 
belittle them as irrational, or conceive of them as something that 
must be contained for the sake of democratic discourse, is to ig- 
nore important aspects of political engagement. 
From the vantage point Connolly describes, finding a means 
by which to engage "truthiness" is indispensable to contemporary 
democracy. As such, the "visceral registers" seem critical to any 
notion of "healthy conflict." How else can we conceive of creative 
interventions in the seemingly intransigent, allegedly irrational 
behaviors that characterize contemporary public life. 
Of course, to re-conceive of visceral registers as a medium 
through which many of one's fellow-citizens engage in public 
and political life is not to grant those registers unquestionable 
authority. The deliverances of "the gut" are not simply imposi- 
tions of "brute data of the body." Though they may well up 
quickly - and overflow and grasp one in ways that are unruly - 
they are, nonetheless, discursively nested. In other words, the gut 
is not sui generis, essentially private, or uncon tes table. And its 
deliverances do not stand entirely outside the "space of reasons." 
Strongly felt, visceral reactions can be analyzed with respect to 
justice. In principle, they may be subject to suasion, revision, and 
adjustment.17 
What Connolly's uggestion rules out is any de facto dismissal 
of the deliverances of "the gut" as purely and simply prohibitive 
of meaningful engagement, and thus to be excluded or re- 
pressed by default. In fact, a viscerally reflective perspective aims 
to remain attuned to ways that "the gut" - even at its most un- 
ruly - may well convey insight and wisdom. This argument seems 
indispensable for a model of healthy conflict. 
Reframed in this way, visceral registers may be engaged cre- 
atively, even if those expressing them resist or refuse explication 
and deliberative exchange. This is a crucial point, especially in 
contexts like the one described at the outset of this essay. For a 
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model of healthy conflict o remain sufficiently expansive under 
such circumstances, its advocates must hold open the possibility 
of "discourse" about the deliverances of the gut. While "the vis- 
ceral" cannot be reduced into propositionally articulated claims, 
it may yet be addressed in a more extended form of 
conversation. 
Clearly, explicating normative attitudes in the form of commit- 
ments and assertions that can be inferentially tracked for their 
internal coherence and truth is indispensable for democratic ex- 
change (and communication generally). This is especially the 
case in circumstances that are amenable to patient and charita- 
ble engagement. However, the pivotal point here is that a viable 
model of healthy conflict must take account of those contexts in 
which patient, conversational modes of engagement are not 
available, or are refused. The measured exchange of reasons may 
quickly be overpowered by the internal contradictions ofthe vis- 
ceral, especially when these lead to strident behaviors. Some cir- 
cumstances require modes of engagement that reach beyond 
standard conceptions of deliberative conversation. Connolly's 
analysis obliges us to envision a type of political encounter char- 
acterized by generosity, in that it seeks at one and the same time 
to struggle with what it opposes and to respect the opponent. 
Here, "generosity" aims to prevent what Connolly calls "an ethos 
of cultural revenge." To put it another way, generosity involves 
the cultivation of what he elsewhere calls "agonistic respect," a 
sensibility that recognizes the inescapability and severity of con- 
flict over issues about which people care deeply.19 One might 
speak of promoting a "generous ethos" involving an expanded 
recognition of the variety of registers in which political engage- 
ment occurs. The aim is to reframe and operationalize these fea- 
tures of deep conflict in ways that are constructive. The question 
is: how shall we accomplish this? 
In response to this question, I should like to call attention to 
developments in peace and conflict studies. Conversation be- 
tween these literatures might contribute to, complicate, and en- 
rich, the notion of healthy conflict o which Kelsay gestures 
above. In the following section, I outline these developments. 
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V. Strategic Nonviolence 
Prevailing conceptions of tolerance aim to promote a stable, 
well-ordered, and peaceful society. On this view, stability and 
peace are understood to be conditions of relative tranquility cre- 
ated through the pre-emption, containment, or resolution of 
conflict. On this account, conflict is antithetical to social stability; 
it is the opposite of peace. From the conflict-transformation per- 
spective, however, such thinking simply perpetuates the problem 
it seeks to resolve. This judgment rests, in part, on the way that 
appeals for tolerance reflect a "negative" conception of peace. 
Negative peace is predicated on the assumption that "conflict" 
designates a problematic condition, an interruption or departure 
from the normal state of affairs. To resolve conflict is thus to re- 
store the status quo. The resulting conception of peace thereby 
focuses on the absence of conflict. "Negative peace" is highly 
contested among scholars because it seems to elide the systemic 
causes of conflict. To put this another way, a focus on tolerance 
leaves untouched those structural, cultural, and relational forms 
of injustice that typically hold in place and perpetuate violence of 
various forms. Conflict resolution focuses so intently on manag- 
ing and mitigating overt circumstances of conflict in the interest 
of facilitating the emergence of peaceful conditions that, how- 
ever inadvertently, it leaves "the root structural causes of con- 
flict. . .untouched," if it addresses the question of such structural 
causes and conditions at all (Lederach, Preparing 16).20 
Conflict-transformation specialists agree that pursuit of peace 
in its "negative dimension" - reduction, containment, and cessa- 
tion of explicit situational conflict - remains necessary. In some 
cases, it is urgent. Yet for the transformational model a focus on 
negative peace is insufficient. Transformationists emphasize the 
necessity of building the conditions of a "positive peace" through 
"the integration of human society" and the development of "a 
pattern of cooperation and integration between human groups" 
(Galtung 29). 21 Without his intentional nd sustained pursuit of 
justice, and the accompanying attention to of structural nd cul- 
tural violence, "peace" becomes a cover for continuing oppres- 
sion. Recall Marcuse's critique of pure tolerance: as he had it, 
surface-level conditions of tranquility often mask pervasive struc- 
tural and cultural forms of violence. The resulting conditions 
may be placid, but they are also unjust.22 
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Of particular relevance to my effort o expand upon the no- 
tion of "healthy conflict" emerging from the religion-in-public- 
life debates is the fact that conflict ransformationists view vio- 
lence, rather than conflict, as the converse of peace. While stand- 
ing against violence in all its forms (direct, structural, and 
cultural), advocates of conflict ransformation are adamant in 
the view that "violence is not simply the intensification fcon- 
flict" (Zehr 182-83). Conflict ransformation re-conceptualizes 
conflict, seeing it as a driver of systemic change (Lederach, Pre- 
paring 18). Indeed, conflict ransformation promotes explicit en- 
gagement in conflict in two ways: the first may be termed 
"situational," and the second, "structural." 
At the situational level, conflict is conceived as a catalyst that 
can be deployed for strategic reasons. Here conflict may be 
"healthy" insofar as participants engage one another in ways that 
expose unjust conditions and facilitate positive change. As an ex- 
ample, consider Martin Luther King Jr.'s description of the in- 
tentional effort by participants in the Civil Rights movement o 
instigate "tension" and "crisis packed" circumstances inorder to 
compel confrontation ver conditions of racial injustice. King ar- 
gued that conflict precipitated by direct, nonviolent forms of civil 
disobedience would illuminate unjust conditions and facilitate 
change by prodding opponents into negotiation.23 If nonvi- 
olence provoked violent responses from defenders of the status 
quo, it might still serve the cause insofar as such violence under- 
mined the legitimacy of existing arrangements.24 
One might think it intuitive that a hallmark of healthy conflict 
is the extent o which the parties in question are willing to toler- 
ate the views of their opponents, with compromise and negoti- 
ated settlements a objectives. And yet, according to proponents 
of conflict ransformation, King's analysis points in another di- 
rection. King's aim in compelling his opponents to enter into 
negotiation was not to arrive at a compromise. He aimed to abol- 
ish unjust laws. To be sure, a willingness to negotiate and even to 
compromise were crucial, when strategically appropriate. Never- 
theless, negotiated settlement and compromise were relative 
goods - good insofar as they served the ends of justice.25 In in- 
stances like the Montgomery Bus Boycott, for instance, a refusal 
to comply with racist laws disrupted existing patterns of race rela- 
tions. Conflict ransformation evaluates uch disruptions in terms 
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Feb 2013 21:03:02 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Tolerance, Civility, and Healthy Conflict 339 
of their potential for transformation. Acts of resistance may trans- 
form the elements of conflict if they can serve as "refraining en- 
actments." The Montgomery Bus Boycott brought economic and 
social pressure to bear upon those in power. It did so not only to 
resist (with the aim of abolishing) racist laws, but also in the 
hope of inspiring new "ways of thinking" about the nature of the 
relationship between whites - some of whom believed themselves 
to be free of harshly racist attitudes and commitments, but were 
nonetheless beneficiaries and perpetuators of racist social struc- 
tures - and their black fellow-citizens.26 In such a case, rejection 
of piecemeal negotiation and compromise was the appropriate 
response rather than pursuing tolerant compromise: the virtue at 
stake is justice, rather than or at least more than tolerance. 
It is important that King operated with a conception of justice 
in which realism regarding the dynamics of power was joined 
with respect for the humanity of one's opponents. More pre- 
cisely, King described the use of conflict as a dialectic between 
love and power.27 Love compels one to refuse to cooperate with 
evil. In the civil rights movement, this refusal took the form of 
prophetic speech, righteous anger, and civil disobedience.28 It
was, however, the same love that infused any denunciation and 
prophetic witness to truth with respect for the humanity and dig- 
nity of King's opponents. Indeed, King spoke of desiring an op- 
ponent's good (in particular, freedom from racism), despite the 
fact that the opponent's actions were directed at preserving con- 
ditions properly denounced as evil. 
For King, love compelled engagement with power at the same 
time that it qualified its use. It compelled an engagement with 
power in the form of the refusal to cooperate with or actively 
resist oppressive social structures and attitudes. Love also placed 
limits on the use of power by requiring that coercive action and 
civil disobedience be nonviolent. Tempered by love, such "mili- 
tant nonviolence" ought never to eliminate the hope for recon- 
ciliation with one's adversary.29 For King, nonviolence ntailed 
the hope that one's opponent's frame of reference might be al- 
tered or reframed, inspiring a recognition of injustice and a de- 
sire for change. The aim, as it had been attributed to Gandhi, 
was to bring one's adversaries to their senses, not to their knees. 
Of course, King exemplifies a highly rarified, goal-directed, 
and strategic onception of conflict as a means to constructive 
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change. His use of conflict was intentional and precisely 
targeted.30 Often, things proceed in a different fashion. Conflict 
erupts unexpectedly, unpredictably, and moves in ways that con- 
trast problematically with King's approach, which ties conflict o 
an organized effort. Itis for this reason that conflict ransforma- 
tion ties situational analysis to a reconceptualization of conflict at 
the structural level. Conflict ransformation promotes building 
capacities that will enable participants to deal with various types 
of conflicts. Here the notion that conflict is not a problem with 
an essence that may be addressed, but rather a phenomenon 
built into social and political ife, is key. Wherever there is rela- 
tionship there will be conflict.31 The operative questions are what 
kind of conflict; how it relates to a particular pattern of relation- 
ships; and thus what goals engagement might serve.32 
At the structural level, conflict ransformation would identify 
conflict as healthy insofar as engagement might illuminate, re- 
frame, and hopefully alter aspects of the relevant patterns of in- 
justice. The aim is to critically assess the structural nd cultural 
dimensions of the relational contexts and histories in which 
those patterns are inscribed. The model opts for the trope of 
transformation (rather than resolution) because it expects the 
persistent resurgence of conflict - particularly as regards matters 
that parties may identify as non-negotiable or that prove to be 
intractable in practice - though it expects such resurgence to 
evolve and manifest itself differently over time. 
One way conflict ransformation attempts to reframe the ele- 
ments of "sudden" conflict involves treating situational aspects of 
conflict as a window into systemic causes. Returning to the exam- 
ple of civil rights, it seems important that King came to recognize 
that overcoming the conditions of racism could not simply be a 
matter of abolishing discriminatory laws and passing new, non- 
discriminatory ones. Certainly, it entailed this. But those surface- 
level circumstances afforded opportunities to shed light on the 
deeper transformations that were necessary - transformations i  
which King found himself implicated. King gradually came to the 
realization that many of the movement's greatest successes would 
ultimately fail if they did not lead to further transformation f 
structures inscribing inequalities related to race and class.33 By 
the time of his death, King saw these as matters requiring atten- 
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tion to foreign, as well as domestic affairs, and thus began to con- 
nect civil rights to a critique of imperialism. 
VI. From King to Colbert 
To indicate what the above approach to healthy conflict might 
look like in our current context, I now want to draw together the 
various strands of "healthy conflict" I have been sketching. Con- 
flict transformationists press us to go beyond analyses of demo- 
cratic deliberation. We are not to ask whether conflict will or will 
not arise, or to think about how to avoid or even to contain and 
resolve it, when necessary. Instead, we should ask, "How can peo- 
ple develop capacities for engaging one another creatively, con- 
structively, and in ways that transform the elements of the 
conflict in the interests of justice?" and "What resources are avail- 
able for this?" Just as importantly, the conflict ransformation 
frame suggests we measure the viability of democratic practices 
less by their power to resolve conflict once and for all, and more 
by their usefulness in illuminating conditions of injustice, spur- 
ring the pursuit of justice and the reduction of structural 
violence. 
How does my effort o sketch an expanded conception of 
healthy conflict fare when summarized with reference to Kelsay's 
sketch of it above? What, for instance, are we to make of the pros- 
pect of directing conflict oward "the possibility of personal and 
social expansion" in an era marked by the refusal of patient and 
conversational exchange, where the parties refuse to listen to 
one another or rebuff norms of reciprocity? What would it mean 
to think about healthy conflict in relation to, for example, the 
Tea Party movement hat emerged following the election of Ba- 
rack Obama? 
A number of social critics and public intellectuals have strug- 
gled to understand and respond to the Tea Party.34 An interven- 
tion that seems to approximate the approach for which I have 
argued is that of Stanley Fish. Fish pointed to the way that Tea 
Party efforts succeeded in altering political discourse in the mid- 
term elections of 2010. He argued that critics' dismissal of the 
Tea Party as deliberatively incoherent in fact only fueled its effec- 
tiveness. Such criticisms proved self-defeating precisely because 
they conformed to a received framing of public discourse in 
which measured rationalism is juxtaposed with "the gut." Fish 
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countered this by appealing to the Greek myth of Anteaus. He 
wrote: 
The Greek mythological figure Antaeus won victory after victory 
because his opponents repeatedly threw him to the ground, not 
realizing that it was the earth (in the figure of his mother, Gaia) 
that nourished him and gave him renewed strength. The Tea 
Party's trength comes from the down-to-earth r etoric it responds 
to and proclaims, and whenever high-brow critics heap the dirt of 
scorn and derision upon the party, its powers increase. . That 
won't work. Better, perhaps, to take a cue from Hercules, who fig- 
ured out the source of Antaeus' strength and defeated him by 
embracing him in a bear hug, lifting him up high, and preventing 
him from touching the ground. Don't sling mud down in the dust 
where your opponents thrive. Instead, engage them as if you 
thought that the concerns they express (if not their forms of ex- 
pression) are worthy of serious consideration, as indeed they are. 
Lift them up to the level of reasons and evidence and see how they 
fare in the rarified air of rational debate where they just might 
suffer the fate of Antaeus. (New York Times, Sept. 27, 2010) 
Here Fish makes an unexpected move, at least from the vantage 
point of many accounts of deliberative democracy. He proposes 
to seriously consider, rather than to dismiss, the concerns that 
drive the Tea Party. Nevertheless, his positive proposal - "lift [ing 
their concerns] up to the level of reasons and evidence and. . . 
rational debate" - reverts to a conventional deliberative re- 
sponse. I think such a response is likely to be ineffective, pre- 
cisely because it reinstates the dichotomous framing of public 
discourse that the Tea Party used to its advantage. That framing 
pins the ideals of rational debate, measured reason-exchange, 
and evidence to the very forms of engagement that many who 
claim the Tea Party mantle despise. They pit their own appeals to 
visceral populism and "down-to-earth rhetoric" against such "elit- 
ist approaches." Thus, Fish's proposition to seriously engage 
voices that from a standard deliberative democratic vantage 
point invite dismissal is consistent with my account of healthy 
conflict. And yet, his prescriptive proposal, to draw public dis- 
course fully within the ambit of measured, evidence-based de- 
bate, falls short of the model of healthy conflict on offer here. 
Healthy conflict, as I have sketched it above, opens the door to - 
in fact, impels the use of - the full breadth of rhetorical modes of 
engagement in situations that frustrate and defy the basic param- 
eters of deliberative exchange. 
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According to conflict-transformation literature, the idea of 
healthy conflict conceptualizes conflict as unavoidable. It is a 
phenomenon intrinsic to social and political relationship. 
Healthy conflict acknowledges the potential irremediability of 
some oppositions, as well as the non-reducibility of passionate, 
visceral registers in matters citizens perceive to be of vital impor- 
tance. Healthy conflict attempts to identify modes of engage- 
ment that permit creative grappling with those elements in a 
particular context that suggest injustice. With reference to the 
Tea Party, I take the reason/gut dichotomy as an illustrative 
piece of a relational configuration that perpetuates conflict. This 
dualism seems to be particularly intransigent in the present con- 
text. I argue that navigating the obstacles it presents to "inter- 
preting one's opponents as reason-givers like oneself requires 
acknowledging, and then creative and expansive grappling with, 
the visceral registers of "the gut." 
Framed in the terms of healthy conflict, a particular citizen's 
logical inconsistencies, oreven his or her outright refusal of dia- 
logue, ought not to occasion charges of conversation-stopping ir- 
rationalism or of simple discursive viciousness. Rather, such 
behaviors invite closer examination - or a look through different 
lenses - at the way a citizen's motivating concerns, orienting 
commitments, relational patterns, and objectives take the place 
of "logical consistency" in the case in question. Reframing of this 
sort presents one (albeit small) example of transforming the ele- 
ments of the conflict. It avoids the de facto disqualification of 
modes of expression that some would term nonsensical. 
At the same time, such a conception of engagement does not 
absolve the parties in a conflict of the duty to assess the substance 
of one another's commitments, with particular attention to the 
dimensions of justice and power. And in fact, identifying the aim 
of justice as a mark of healthy conflict means that one cannot 
play down the fact that many conflicts will involve disputes about 
the nature and basis of justice. This means that any struggle for 
justice must be accompanied by efforts to establish and promote 
a particular account of that ideal.35 Again, the primary question 
becomes how to deal creatively and innovatively with the ele- 
ments present in a conflict over the very meaning of social 
norms. 
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With regard to the reason/gut dichotomy, a conception of 
healthy conflict that reflects upon the unyielding nature of the 
visceral registers provides a means of challenging the power dif- 
ferences built into the organization of "public discourse" and 
"public life." Marshalling and unleashing visceral "force" may 
have the effect of disrupting a relational context in which "the 
force of the better reason" is believed to hold sway. Of course, 
disrupting public discourse may itself be an intentional tactic, to 
the extent that deliberative incoherence and rage may serve the 
program of one party more than others. The operative questions 
are: To what ends does a particular appeal to the gut aim? What 
will be its effects? Is it surreptitious or forthright? Does it involve 
intentional manipulation? If so, by whom? And, of course, how 
shall citizens contend with it? It is with these questions that we 
not only rejoin Connolly, but perhaps even more instructively, 
Stephen Colbert. Connolly himself proposes a strategy of 
Expos [ing] the tactics of those who do not themselves call atten- 
tion to them; you introduce counterstrategies of cultural-corporeal 
infusion attached to a more generous vision of public life; and you 
publicize, as you proceed, how these counterstrategies themselves 
impinge upon the affectively rich, nonconscious layers of life. The 
way in which Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart mimic and exagger- 
ate the orchestration fimage, voice, music, sound, and rhythm by 
media stars uch as Bill O'Reilly provides one starting point. They 
do not simply expose factual misstatements - an inadequate re- 
sponse to influences exerted in part upon affective states ituated 
below the refined intellect. Instead, they fight fire with fire, reen- 
acting media strategies of inculcation by parodying them. ("Expe- 
rience," 70) 
I would add here that the key to the effectiveness of such an in- 
tervention is not that Colbert simply parodies elements of cul- 
tural and political conflict, but that he inhabits a role out of 
which he spins an alternative discursive frame. Habitation of this 
role portrays an alteration of the discourse through reframing it 
("reframing enactment" in the terms of conflict transformation), 
opening possibilities for speaking provocatively and in ways that 
might, in effect, involve a transposition of perspective. 
Transposing perspective in this sense involves more than find- 
ing a way of hearing those for whom there would otherwise be no 
hope for dialogue. Someone like Colbert resists dichotomies by 
confusing them. The inhabited role, admittedly fictional at some 
moments, cuts in upon "real life" at others, yet without produc- 
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ing any simple synthesis.36 Claims that are incoherent or invalid 
from a logical point of view, empirically false, or in conflict with 
the self-interests of those who make them, are re-conceptualized 
through rhetoric. In bringing this spin and manipulation to 
light, the performance refocuses attention on the questions: 
What aims and objectives are at stake? What are the motivations 
of particular agents? What is the basis and character of the ac- 
count of justice which undergirds their efforts? How best might 
one initiate counter-narratives and strengthen efforts aimed at 
justice? 
Tempting though it might be, I am not proposing here a 
model of engagement that sets as its standard the comic artistry 
of Stephen Colbert (and the room full of writers who compose 
his material). However, to say that the Colbert Report is nothing 
more than passive entertainment misses the incisiveness of the 
intervention. While it cannot displace the difficult on-the-ground 
work of combating injustice and pursuing peace in its positive 
dimensions, such performances nonetheless illuminate the 
value - even the indispensability - of atypical modes of engage- 
ment: as Stephen Colbert says of Stephen Colbert, "embody[ing] 
the bullshit until hopefully ou can smell it" {Rolling Stone, Sept. 
2009) .37 Moreover, in the case of Colbert, the performance ac- 
complishes its task by targeting - even utilizing - the intensities 
of "the gut."38 
Conclusion 
I walked to campus on the morning of President Obama's 
Commencement address. As in the previous weeks, crowds as- 
sembled at the front entryway, waving the many signs I had come 
to expect. Counter-protesters had gathered as well. One person 
with a bullhorn chanted over and over the lines: "Abortion on 
demand, and without apology/ without his basic right, women 
cannot be free!" As I proceeded past the Performing Arts Center, 
a woman was praying on her knees surrounded by a ring of po- 
lice, themselves surrounded by a ring of camera-clad media. She 
was one among many arrested that day for trespassing while pray- 
ing on the campus grounds in an act of civil disobedience. 
President Obama was in peak form in the speech he delivered. 
He built all the right bridges. He spoke of how his work as a 
community organizer led him to collaborate with Chicago's Car- 
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dinal Bernardin and local Catholic churches. He recounted his 
own journey to becoming a Christian. He anchored the speech 
in the claim that, though the divisions ran deep on this issue, 
surely everyone could agree that abortion is a heart-wrenching 
decision with deep moral and spiritual dimensions, and that it is 
desirable to reduce the total number of abortions - and the 
number of unwanted pregnancies.39 
The news networks were present in force, and several of them 
broadcast the ceremony live and uninterrupted. Faculty had 
been told to anticipate hecklers, and indeed two or three in at- 
tendance shouted at Obama at different points with "Abortion is 
murder. Stop killing our children!" One of them was disruptive 
enough to ignite among a large portion of the audience a repeti- 
tion of Obama's 2008 campaign slogan 'Yes we can!" That was 
quickly over-taken by the collective mantra from the graduating 
class, "We are ND!" The media got elements of the spectacle they 
anticipated, though the event was far from the circus promised 
by Randall Terry. Certainly no typical commencement ceremony, 
it was nonetheless respectful, even civil. 
As one who supported the President's invitation and honorary 
degree, and was inclined to find persuasive his account of a civil 
and patient search for common ground in light of heated opposi- 
tion, I found the opening moments of his speech elating. It was 
perhaps eight or ten minutes into Obama's address that I first 
noticed what began as a scratching irritation of background 
noise - initially, barely noticeable, perhaps like the chirping of 
crickets. Gradually the sound pushed itself forward into my 
awareness and rose to full pitch, grabbing hold of my attention. 
The sounds morphed into a high-pitched chorus - loud, inces- 
sant, rhythmic. It was the sound of babies crying. There was no 
identifiable direction from which the sounds were coming. They 
came from all sides, as I strained to track them. The sounds were 
distracting, irritating, chilling. The sound of crying inserted itself 
viscerally into Obama's high rhetoric and his elegant case for tol- 
erance and common ground regarding the controversies that 
framed the day.40 
Outside, a few hundred meters from the Joyce Center, as many 
as two thousand people had gathered - priests, faculty, students, 
some of whom had boycotted their Commencement, and their 
families. The priests held mass, speakers addressed their audi- 
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enees, and people prayed together. Some in attendance would 
later reflect on the spectacle of the preceding weeks, and the 
protestors at the gates in particular. They were outsiders, some 
suggested. They detracted from the propriety and respectfulness 
of the student-led opposition to the position represented by Pres- 
ident Obama. They had relied on disruption, shock, and pag- 
eantry. They had abandoned the best weapon at the disposal of 
those who opposed abortion: arguments. 
I was not entirely certain of this. Clearly, there had been no 
argument to counter President Obama' s from the commence- 
ment platform, no formal exchange of reasons or tracking of 
claims and counter-claims. However, what had been wedged into 
the event (and into much of the preceding weeks) involved vis- 
ceral disruption and the creation of dissonance as forms of insur- 
gent intervention. The effect of this intervention had been to 
alter the deliberative frame of those moments, a refraining in 
light of which I was not certain how to respond. Coming to rec- 
ognize and contend with this as a form of being viscerally en- 
gaged was only a starting point, of course. To recognize this as 
engagement is not to replace practices of tracking inferences and 
holding one another accountable to the implications of their 
claims. It is, rather, to conceive of those practices more expan- 
sively, and to do so as a necessary step in crafting a sufficiently 
capacious account of healthy conflict for a moment in which con- 
flict seems to be intractable. The aim is to engage in conflict 
transformatively, rather than simply to tolerate difference. This 
seems indispensable for those who would traverse the dichoto- 
mous oppositions that currently frame public life, and who wish 
to resist he temptations of blanket condemnation of opponents 
(on the one hand), and despair or shoulder-shrugging refusal 
(on the other).41 
NOTES 
1. For a meticulous articulation of the former, see McKinnon, Toleration. For 
examples of the latter, see Hostetler and McDowell, New Tolerance, and Stet- 
son and Conti, Truth About Intolerance. 
2. Modern conceptions of toleration emerged largely, though not exclusively, 
in the form of an opposition between reason and independent thinking, on 
one hand, and religious uperstition, fanaticism, and the alleged arbitrari- 
ness of the claims of traditional authority, on the other. To take an example 
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that would become particularly influential in the U.S. context, in works 
such as "A Letter Concerning Toleration" and "The Reasonableness of 
Christianity," John Locke made the case that religious beliefs which were 
held reasonably stood in stark contrast o the dangerous dictates of urge, 
inclination and prejudice most exemplified by the "religious enthusiasts" of
his day. Locke argued that such enthusiasts neglected their epistemic duties 
in that they refused to weigh and measure the reasonableness of what they 
took to be moments of direct enlightenment from God. They thus mistook 
their own passions and interests for God's special revelation to them. They 
suffered, Locke wrote, from a "warmed or overweening brain" (IV, xix, 7), 
and "melancholy. . .mixed with devotion" (iv, xix, 5). The result was socially 
dangerous. "Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opin- 
ion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from 
the Spirit of God, and presently of divine authority: and whatsoever odd 
action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is 
concluded to be a call or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed" (IV, 
xix, 6) . As a correlate of a reasonable approach to religious belief, tolerance 
would promote social stability and peace. For an account of the opposition 
between reason and tolerance, and passion and fanaticism as it emerged in 
Locke's work, see Wolterstorff (118-19). For a broader account, see Fisher 
(chap. 3). 
ó. l use the phrase the religion-in-pubhc-liie debates here to designate to a 
range texts and exchanges over recent decades (see the bibliography for 
numerous examples) . Drawing pivotal insights from the "religion-in-public- 
life" debates in philosophical and religious ethics into conversation with 
insights from the conflict transformation literature in peace studies is a par- 
ticular contribution that this article aims to make. Mine is not the first at- 
tempt to bring conflict transformation i to the ambit of broader 
conversations inthe study of religion. Earlier efforts include Appleby, Am- 
bivalence, esp. Chapter 6; Little and Appleby, "Religious Peacebuliding"; Lit- 
tle, "Peace, Justice, and Religion." Omer provides perhaps the most 
meticulous positioning available so far of religion and conflict literature in 
the broader study of religion vis-à-vis conflict transformation a d 
peacebuilding literature in peace studies in her article, "Can a Critic be a 
Caretaker Too?" 
4. The tendency to focus orientationally upon deadly conflict and explicit 
forms of violence is most apparent in the seminal account of religion and 
conflict ransformation articulated by Little and Appleby. As I discuss be- 
low, the multidimensional account for which I am arguing has been the 
subject of much debate in peace research literature for several decades. 
This dimension of the literature has recently found more refined articula- 
tion in Lederach and Appleby, "Strategic Peacebuilding." The present arti- 
cle aims to contribute to, and press forward, the strategy expressed in the 
more recent literature. 
5. Kelsay's point responded irectly to Sumner Twiss's claim that "the theme 
of moral conflict resolution is, for Stout, the principle and proper aim of 
comparative ethics" (Twiss 653). Stout endorsed Kelsay's characterization 
to the extent that it aided in illuminating his motivating concern as not 
merely resolving moral conflicts, but also as "aiming for justice, practical 
wisdom, and civic friendship as conceived by democratic lights." As I 
demonstrate below, these positive dimensions of Stout's approach to moral 
conflict place his project in close proximity to conflict transformation litera- 
ture ("Comment" 724). 
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6. Criticisms along these lines were perhaps most trenchantly leveled by Gil- 
bert Meilaender in his review of Democracy and Tradition. Paul Weithman 
touched on similar concerns in his review in Faith and Philosophy. Stout's 
own responses to criticisms of this kind can be found throughout his later 
text, Blesssed Are the Organized. 
7. Susan Herbst addresses ome of these examples in Rude Democracy. For a 
particularly trenchant diagnosis of the toxic effects of contemporary media 
in public discourse, see Jamieson and Capella, Echo Chamber. Journalist Kate 
Zernike provides observational description of the emergence and develop- 
ment of the Tea Party in Boiling Mad. For pointed examples, see Friedman, 
"Too Good to Check"; Pew Research Center, "Growing Number"; and CBS 
News/NYT Poll, "One in Four Americans." 
8. Such a position comes through particularly clearly in Galston and Nivola, 
"Delineating the Problem." 
9. In a more recent essay, Maclntyre has reflected explicitly on the goods that 
are available through conflict when it is situated in an epistemic context 
that is sufficiently unified. In the absence of such coherence, he has reiter- 
ated in his current work, conflict in liberal-democratic contexts tends to 
inspire what he calls "pseudo-democratic babble," which he takes to be ex- 
emplified by much grassroots political activism in the contemporary United 
States. To counter this, Maclntyre has proposed forms of censorship in con- 
temporary U.S. public discourse modeled on the laws that criminalize holo- 
caust denial in various European states. See Maclntyre, "Toleration"; and 
his Phillip Quinn Memorial Lecture, "Intolerance, Censorship, and Other 
Requirements of Rationality." 
10. See Wuthnow {America 286-87). 
11. See Marcuse ("Repressive Tolerance" 32-59). 
12. Marcuse's caution is that, even if acknowledged as a key ingredient for 
peace and social stability, there are great dangers in mistaking tolerance as 
sufficient in itself, and in overlooking its capacity to take on vicious and 
repressive forms. 
13. The "Responses to Religious Diversity Project" (1999-2005) found that, 
while 80% of the representative survey sample agreed that tolerance of re- 
ligious diversity is good for America, 60% of the same sample favored the 
U.S. government monitoring and collecting information about Muslim re- 
ligious groups in the United States (51% favored the same for Hindu relig- 
ious groups; 48% for Buddhist religious groups) . Nearly 40% of the same 
sample favored making it harder for Muslims to settle in the United States, 
and 66% favored "keeping a close watch on all foreigners" in the United 
States. Wuthnow offers a sobering analysis of this segment of the project's 
findings in "Religious Diversity". Full results of the Responses to Religious 
Diversity Project (1999-2005) appear at: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/ 
Files/Descriptions/DFVERSTY.asp. More recent survey work remains 
largely consistent with the findings of Wuthnow's project. See Pew Research 
Center, "Public Remains Conflicted." 
14. 1 take this définition of tolerance from David Little ( Tolerance, Equal 
Freedom" 3-4). 
15. See further Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas (1871), as quoted in Cornel 
West, "Prospects." This insight, Scott Appleby points out, is familiar to his- 
torians of American politics, some of whom have documented that in- 
stances of incivility - at times even in the form of fistfights on the floor of 
Congress - were once daily news. 
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16. Connolly is far from the first o uncover this insight. He traces the geneal- 
ogy of his own interest in it back to Nietzsche's claim that "we think with 
our stomachs," referring to "thoughts behind your thoughts and thoughts 
behind those thoughts" and "'concealed gardens and plantings' below the 
threshold of reflective surveillance." Itwould be insufficient to trace the 
relevant concerns only to Nietzsche, however. Identifying another precur- 
sor no less influential, Ingrid Creppel and Stephen Toulmin have dealt at 
length (each in different ways) with Michel de Montaigne's articulation of 
"toleration" as a process of acknowledging and grappling with what might 
be called the incorrigibility of embodiment. Montaigne's conception of 
what it means to "tolerate" differences reflects the insights of renaissance- 
humanism rather than a Cartesian conception, which aimed to overcome 
authoritarian d prejudice-based intolerance with sober and calculated ra- 
tionalism. For Montaigne, "tolerance" of external oppositions could 
emerge only in the wake of recognition of, and grappling with, the multi- 
plicity of one's own internal proclivities toward intolerance, and especially 
each person's recognition of the multiplicity of selves in him or herself - 
conflicting desires, "inconstancy," internal particularities - and that these 
multiple selves harbor intolerances toward one another. See Toulmin ( Cos- 
mopolis 37-40) and Creppell {Toleration 65-90). 
17. I expand upon this point in conversation with Connolly in my essay Dis- 
mantling the Master's House'" (esp. 436-40). Connolly devotes his book 
Neuropolitics to delineating a program of concrete micro-political strategies 
by which one might cultivate one's sensibilities - one's "gut" reactions - in 
ways that overcome inclinations toward resentment and revenge. The point 
is consistent with Stout's characterization f"normative attitudes" that are 
non-inferentially elicited in perception and experience (Democracy 213-24). 
Stout develops the point derived from Wilfrid Sellars' Empiricism. See Stout 
("Davidson, Rorty, and Brandom" 36-37). 
18. This point does not stand far from the philosophical background that in- 
spired John Kelsay's gloss of Stout's proposal as pointing importantly in the 
direction of "healthy conflict." In fact, Robert Brandom, whose Making It 
Explicit afforded many of the philosophical materials with which Stout con- 
structed his account of democratic practices in Democracy and Tradition, 
demonstrated much earlier (and at great analytical length) that logical con- 
sistency in thought and assertion is not an absolute good, and thus, that 
localizable inconsistency need not be viewed as intrinsically and entirely epi- 
stemically vitiating. See Rescher and Brandom (Logic of Inconsistency 136- 
41). Examining in detail the extent to which the work by Brandom and 
Rescher on this can accommodate, and perhaps inform, the approach I am 
sketching here would carry me too far from my present argument to under- 
take in this context, and will likely require an article-length treatment on its 
own. 
19. On the "ethos of cultural revenge," see Connolly (Capitalism 4); on his ac- 
count of agonistic respect, see Connolly (Secularist 157). 
20. For a key account of the differences between conflict resolution and con- 
flict ransformation, see Botes, "Conflict Transformation." 
21. In his 1964 editorial on the subject, Johan Galtung defined "negative 
peace" as 'the absence of violence, the absence of war," and positive peace 
as "the integration of human society." Debates ensued over the extent to 
which the bourgeoning field of peace research ought to concern itself only 
with "negative peace," rather than peace in both its negative and positive 
forms. In a follow-up essay of 1968, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 
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Galtung came to expand upon "negative peace" as "the absence of organ- 
ized violence between such major human groups as nations, but also be- 
tween racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude that can be 
reached by internal wars" and positive peace as "a pattern of cooperation 
and integration between major human groups." Kathleen Maas-Weigert in- 
cisively recounts the genesis and development of these distinctions inher 
article, "Structural Violence." 
22. The deficiency of conceiving conflict resolution in abstraction from justice 
is the pivotal insight to which Stout pointed when he responded to Sumner 
Twiss's characterization fhis conception of comparative ethics as "moral 
conflict resolution." Stout responded that "merely resolving moral conflicts 
is not an adequate goal, even in relatively limited contexts. One reason for 
this is that a conflict can be resolved when two parties who were once at 
loggerheads come to share the same vicious or mistaken moral judgments" 
(724). 
23. King wrote: "My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the 
nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am 
not afraid of the word 'tension.' I have earnestly opposed violent ension, 
but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for 
growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the 
mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half 
truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, 
so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of ten- 
sion in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice 
and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. The 
purpose of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis 
packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. I therefore con- 
cur with you in your call for negotiation. Too long has our beloved South- 
land been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than 
dialogue" ("Birmingham Tail" 86-87). 
24. This effect is referred to by Gene Sharp as "political jiu-jitsu": By combin- 
ing nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in struggle, the 
nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponent's repression to be 
expressed in the worst possible light." In responding non-violently to vio- 
lent efforts to repress resistance, "the violence of the opponents may re- 
bound to undermine their own position" {Nonviolent Action 657) . See also 
"Beyond Just War" 235-36. 
25. Exemplified in the writing and work of King, and by Mahatma Gandhi 
before him, this pivotal insight about negotiation and compromise in trans- 
formative justice has been distilled in the writings of Gene Sharp. See, in 
particular, "The Dangers of Negotiations" passages in From Dictatorship (9-
10). Sharp argues that, when framed by an imbalance of power, piecemeal 
negotiations, partial concessions, and compromise agreements typically 
benefit he group in power. Such a pattern of effects produced by "partial 
or temporary concessions" by authorities in power is further substantiated 
by Ackerman and Kruegler in Strategic Nonviolent Conflict (325). 
26. See Kriesberg ("Transforming Conflicts" chap. 3). 
27. "What is needed is a realization that power without love is reckless and abu- 
sive, and love without power is sentimental nd anemic. Power at its best is 
love implementing the demands of justice and justice at its best is power 
correcting everything that stands against love" (King, "Where do We Go?" 
172). 
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28. King wrote that even the most deeply engrained anger, if constructively 
reframed and creatively utilized, could motivate and fuel a campaign of 
"militant, massive nonviolence," rather than simply devolve into rioting 
("Showdown," A Testament of Hope 69). 
29. See "Conversations with Martin Luther King" (A Testament of Hope 661). 
30. See, for instance, King's address, "Nonviolence: The Only Road to Free- 
dom" (/ Have A Dream 132-34). "Our most powerful nonviolent weapon is, 
as would be expected, also our most demanding, that is organization. To 
produce change, people must be organized to work together in units of 
power" (133). 
31. While it does not begin with King's Christian commitment toagape love per 
se, conflict ransformation le ses can accommodate his tradition-specific 
orientation because it conceives of conflict as, most basically, a feature of 
human relationality. Relationship is a central concept around which the 
other insights in the complex revolve. However, conflict ransformation 
construes relationship loosely enough to serve an orientation that might 
accommodate any number of more tradition-specific relational concep- 
tions. For this reason, it is not identical to, yet is consistent with, Gandhi's 
commitment to "ahimsa" - meaning literally "non-injury," but which for 
Gandhi, came to be construed as a positive state of love. Arguably, the role 
of relationship in conflict ransformation could similarly accommodate 
Connolly's conception of "agonistic respect." On the points of similarity 
between Gandhi's "ahimsa" and King's account of agape, see Kilgore ("In- 
fluence of Gandhi" 236-43). For a detailed account of the orientational role 
of relationship in conflict ransformation, see Lederach {Moral Imagination 
31-40). For an example of conflict ransformation le ses applied to the Is- 
raeli-Palestinian conflict, see Omer, When Peace is Not Enough. 
32. For two key statements about this starting point for the model, see Leder- 
ach and Appleby ("Strategic Peacebuilding" 19-24) and Lederach, Little 
Book. 
33. King's later thinking about the necessity of systemic analysis and structural 
transformation f oppressive conditions is perhaps most succinctly con- 
tained in his 1967 address to the Southern Christian Leadership Confer- 
ence, "Where do We Go From Here?" 
34. A sample would include Lilla, "Tea Party Jacobins"; Bernstein, "Very Angry 
Tea Party"; Fish, "Antaeus and the Tea Party"; and Bromwhich, "Why Has 
Obama." For important background on the Tea Party movement, see 
Mayer, "Covert Operations." For scholarly assessment see Williamson, 
Skocpol, and Coggin, "The Tea Party." 
35. For an expanded account the role of "hegemonic struggle" in developing 
an orientational ccount of justice, see Springs, "On Giving." 
36. Perhaps the most pivotal example of this is Stephen Colbert's formulation 
of a Political Action Committee and Super PAC in the wake of the Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. (2010) ruling. See, for instance, 
Carr, "Comic's PAC." 
37. The full question and answer reads: "[Strauss] Tell me about the differ- 
ence BETWEEN THE WAY YOU AND JON STEWART DECONSTRUCT THE NEWS. [Col- 
bert] Jon deconstructs he news in a really brilliant comedie style. I take the 
sausage backwards, and I restuff the sausage. We deconstruct, but then we 
don't show anybody our deconstruction. We reconstruct - we falsely con- 
struct he hypocrisy. And I embody the bullshit until hopefully ou can 
smell it." 
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38. Instances of "preposterous comedy" afford what Ralph Ellison called "indis- 
pensible agency" by opening up "redeeming perspectives on our rampant 
incongruities" ("An Extravagance" 658). In my judgment, the point is con- 
sistent with Montaigne's account of "tolerance" (op.cit.). The incisiveness 
of Colbert's comic artistry, however, does not only consist in illuminating 
the rampant incongruities in his audience members. As Danielle Allen 
points out, Ellison claimed that the pivotal difference between the capaci- 
ties and efforts of an artist (of whatever sort) vs. a skillful trickster o  con 
man consist in their respective moral intentions. This observation, Allen 
continues, parallels Aristotle's claim that the difference b tween the sophist 
and the rhetorician lies in each one's prohairesis (roughly, moral purpose or 
commitment) . Thus, to construe Colbert as a rhetorician of comic artistry 
(in Ellison's sense) might locate the most salient ethical and critical value 
of his "preposterous comedy" in, as Colbert phrased it, "embody [ing] the 
bullshit until hopefully ou can smell it," with the relevant sense of "bull- 
shit" being the one explained by Harry Frankfurt. See Frankfurt's "On Bull- 
shit" and Allen's "A Multilingual America?" (272, 279n22). Stout's response 
to Allen's important exposition of Ellison on this point follows in the same 
issue of Soundings, in "Responses." 
39. "When we open up our hearts and our minds to those who may not think 
precisely like we do or believe precisely what we believe - that's when we 
discover at least the possibility of common ground. That's when we begin to 
say, 'Maybe we won't agree on abortion, but we can still agree that this 
heart-wrenching decision for any woman is not make casually, it has both 
moral and spiritual dimensions." The full text appears as an appendix to 
Herbst (Rude Democracy 68-100, 149-59). 
40. For one example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWJPOflQKwA: 
15:00. 
41. 1 presented an early version of this paper to the Religion, Ethics & Philoso- 
phy colloquium at Florida State University in November 2010. I am grateful 
for especially incisive criticisms and questions raised by the students there, 
and for conversations with Aline Kalbian, Martin Kavka, and John Kelsay. 
Later revisions benefkted from comments and questions put to me by col- 
leagues Scott Appleby, Dan Philpott, and Atalia Omer, and continuing con- 
versations with John Paul Lederach and David Cortright. 
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